Navy - Manufacturing - China, Korea, U.S.A. and More

1. South Korea’s shipbuilding capacity and capabilities.

2. The United States — Newport News as crown jewel but bottleneck.

3. China’s massive industrial shipbuilding machine.

4. Other U.S. yards, including Florida’s smaller contributions and Tampa’s lost capacity.

5. World War II shipbuilding — what America once could do.

6. Closing reflection — U.S. manufacturing today: not decimated, not annihilated, but dangerously hollowed out.

1 - South Korea’s Shipbuilding Might

If you want to understand modern naval power, you cannot skip over South Korea. What that country has built on its southeastern coast is staggering. The city of Ulsan is home to Hyundai Heavy Industries, the largest shipyard on Earth, and right next to it sits Hyundai Mipo Dockyard. Together, they form an industrial footprint so large that you could lose an entire American city inside it.

Let’s put some American measurements on the table. Ulsan’s main yard sprawls across nearly 1,600 acres of waterfront. That is about 2.5 square miles of dry docks, assembly halls, cranes, piers, and fitting-out basins. Compare that to a typical American football stadium, which takes up about 13 acres. Hyundai’s yard alone is the equivalent of more than 120 football stadiums laid side by side. And this is not counting the additional footprint of Hyundai Mipo just down the shoreline.

What comes out of those yards is just as impressive as the size. In commercial terms, they can produce up to 10 million gross tons of shipping a year. That is not a typo. Ten million. In plain English, that means dozens of supertankers, container ships, LNG carriers, and yes, naval combatants if the order book calls for them. They have the flexibility to switch production lines from a commercial ship one year to a naval frigate the next. That kind of dual-use capacity gives South Korea enormous strategic flexibility.

Now, South Korea does not focus exclusively on warships the way America’s Newport News does, but it does produce highly capable naval vessels. Frigates, destroyers, submarines — even amphibious assault ships — roll off the same lines that once produced the biggest commercial ships on Earth. The reason they can do this is that the government has backed the industry with research and development investment, and the shipyards themselves have consolidated. Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hyundai Mipo are in the process of merging, which will further concentrate expertise and capacity under one roof.

There is also geography to consider. Ulsan has room to grow. The yards are spread along a wide stretch of coastline with industrial access to rail, road, and raw materials. Unlike America’s Newport News, which is boxed in by a river and a city grid, Ulsan can add new dry docks, extend its piers, and build new fabrication halls as demand requires. That means their growth curve can keep bending upward.

The scale, the throughput, and the flexibility all point to the same conclusion: South Korea, though not a superpower in the way China aspires to be, has built an industrial base that dwarfs anything in the United States outside of one or two specialized yards. They may not build nuclear-powered carriers or submarines, but in terms of acreage, tonnage, and speed, Ulsan makes most U.S. facilities look small.

This is important because South Korea’s industry feeds not only its own navy but also the global market. They can export frigates to Southeast Asia, submarines to Europe, and commercial shipping worldwide. Their shipyards never sit idle, and that constant churn keeps their workforce trained, their supply chains warm, and their balance sheets healthy. By contrast, many American yards sit underused between Navy contracts, waiting for the next program to be funded.

So, when we talk about naval shipbuilding capacity, South Korea represents a different model: enormous industrial acreage, dual-use flexibility, government support, and room to expand. It is not the crown jewel of nuclear carriers like Newport News, but it is the steel-on-steel production powerhouse that proves what can be done when a nation treats shipbuilding as a strategic industry.

2 - Newport News — The Crown Jewel and the Bottleneck

When people in the United States think of shipbuilding, the conversation almost always comes back to Newport News, Virginia. And for good reason. Newport News Shipbuilding is the only place on earth that builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and it is one of only two places in the United States that constructs nuclear submarines. That makes it the crown jewel of American naval power. But being the crown jewel does not mean it is perfect. In fact, it is both a symbol of unmatched capability and a warning sign about fragility.

Let us talk size first. The yard at Newport News covers a little over 550 acres. That sounds large until you compare it to the mega-yards in South Korea or China. Remember, Ulsan sprawls across more than 1,500 acres. Jiangnan, outside Shanghai, covers close to 3 square miles. By comparison, Newport News looks compact, even cramped. The James River hems it in on one side, the city on the other. There is no more room to spread out. What you see is what you get.

Now consider throughput. Newport News builds the most complicated ships ever put to sea: aircraft carriers that displace over 100,000 tons each and nuclear submarines that can stay underwater for months. But here is the catch: an aircraft carrier takes close to a decade from keel laying to commissioning. A submarine takes years. At any given time, the yard is juggling a small handful of projects, each one consuming massive amounts of labor, materials, and oversight. This is not a place that can suddenly double output if the Navy needs more hulls.

And that gets to the bottleneck problem. If Newport News is the only place that builds carriers, then every carrier in the U.S. Navy depends on one yard. If that yard faces a labor shortage, a supply chain problem, or even just an accident, the entire fleet feels the ripple. There is no backup. During World War II, America spread its shipbuilding across dozens of yards. Today, our most valuable naval assets come out of one fenced compound in Virginia.

The workforce at Newport News is highly skilled, no question about it. These are welders, engineers, and nuclear specialists who work under the strictest safety standards in the world. But it is also an aging workforce, and training replacements is not easy. The pipeline for skilled trades is not what it was in the 1940s. That makes Newport News not just a bottleneck in terms of geography but also in human capital.

The costs reflect this reality. Carriers run into the billions, and delays are common. Oversight from Congress, regulatory hurdles, and the sheer complexity of nuclear propulsion all slow things down. Contrast that with Ulsan or Jiangnan, where commercial discipline pushes efficiency. Newport News operates in a world where cost overruns are almost expected.

So here is the paradox: Newport News is both irreplaceable and limited. It gives the United States the ability to project power across the globe in a way no other country can match. China may be building carriers, but they are still working out catapults and arresting gear. South Korea has the acreage but not the nuclear know-how. Newport News is where American naval supremacy lives.

But at the same time, it is a single point of failure. It is small compared to Asian yards, slow compared to commercial shipbuilders, and boxed in by geography, regulation, and politics. That is why I call it the crown jewel and the bottleneck. It is the pride of the Navy, but it is also the Achilles’ heel of American shipbuilding.

3 - China’s Industrial Shipbuilding Machine

If Newport News is the crown jewel of U.S. shipbuilding, then China’s shipyards are the roaring steel mills of naval mass production. Where America has one or two specialized yards, China has lined its entire coastline with ship factories, each one sprawling over acres of concrete, steel, and cranes. The numbers are almost too big to believe, and they explain why the Chinese navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, has grown faster than any other fleet in the world.

Let’s take this geographically, because rattling off Chinese names is not helpful to most American listeners.

Near Shanghai, along the Yangtze estuary, sits China’s biggest and most modern naval yard. This complex covers about 3 square miles—that’s roughly six times the size of Newport News. Here, China built its newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, which is undergoing trials. This same yard also produces the Type 055 destroyers, ships so large that many Western analysts call them cruisers. These are 13,000-ton warships bristling with missiles, radar, and modern electronics. The scale is astonishing: in one aerial photograph, you can see three destroyers under construction, two frigates being fitted out, and a carrier moored alongside, all in the same shot.

Farther north, up near Dalian, is another massive yard. This is where China built its second carrier, the Shandong. The yard itself is enormous, rivaling the biggest commercial yards in the world. It has multiple dry docks and long assembly halls, enough to keep dozens of major hulls in progress at once.

West along the coast, near Huludao, sits China’s nuclear submarine yard. This facility is shrouded in secrecy, with covered halls that keep satellites from seeing what is being built inside. What we do know is that this is where China’s nuclear-powered submarines are produced. The yard has been expanded in recent years, and it now has the ability to construct multiple submarines at the same time.

Down south, near Guangzhou, China operates another cluster of yards that specialize in frigates, corvettes, and amphibious ships. These yards have been pumping out smaller but still capable warships, like the Type 054 frigates and the Type 056 corvettes. They have also built China’s landing helicopter docks, the Type 075 amphibious assault ships. These look very much like small aircraft carriers and can carry helicopters, landing craft, and marines—perfect tools for operations in the South China Sea or even Taiwan.

When you add it all up, China’s shipbuilding machine is unmatched. In just four years, their biggest yards launched nearly 40 major warships totaling over half a million tons of displacement. That is more steel in the water than most countries have in their entire navy. And they did it while still building commercial vessels—container ships, tankers, LNG carriers—on the side. That commercial activity keeps the yards running at full tilt, ensures a steady flow of workers and materials, and means the workforce never loses its edge.

Contrast this with America. Newport News might launch one carrier every eight to ten years. Bath Iron Works might produce one destroyer at a time. Ingalls might push out an amphibious ship every couple of years. Meanwhile, China is sliding multiple destroyers into the water every few months, plus frigates, plus amphibious ships, plus a carrier. The difference is not just one of numbers; it is one of industrial philosophy. China treats shipbuilding the way America once did during World War II—as a strategic industry that underwrites national security.

Now, there are caveats. Chinese ships are not all at the technological level of their American counterparts. Their carriers are not nuclear-powered, their catapults are new and unproven, their submarines are still quieter than ours. But quantity has a quality all its own. When you can flood the seas with hulls, even if they are not individually as advanced, you change the balance of power.

So here is the picture: while Newport News represents unmatched specialization, China represents unstoppable scale. One yard in Virginia versus multiple mega-yards stretching from the north of China all the way to the south. America builds a few nuclear masterpieces. China builds fleets. That is the gap we are staring at today.

4 - The Other U.S. Yards, Florida’s Role, and Tampa’s Lost Capacity

When you step back from Newport News and look at the rest of America’s naval shipbuilding map, you realize how small and specialized it really is. We are not a country dotted with mega-yards anymore. Instead, we are a country with just a handful of critical facilities, each one tied to a single type of ship, each one with very little margin for error.

In Maine, Bath Iron Works builds destroyers — specifically, the Arleigh Burke class. It has been doing so for decades, and while it is a capable yard, it is also limited. One or two destroyers in progress at any given time, that is the rhythm. In Mississippi, Ingalls Shipbuilding carries much of the load for amphibious ships and also turns out destroyers. Ingalls is big by American standards, but again, it is only one yard.

Submarines are split between Newport News and Electric Boat, which operates in Groton, Connecticut, and Quonset Point, Rhode Island. These two yards handle the nuclear sub fleet, including the Virginia-class attack subs and the new Columbia-class ballistic missile subs. Their order books are full, their schedules tight, and their ability to surge production is practically nonexistent.

Beyond those names, the rest of the picture gets thin. A few smaller yards in Wisconsin, Louisiana, and Alabama have turned out littoral combat ships, patrol craft, or support vessels. These are important, but they are not front-line capital ships. They are niche players.

And then there is Florida. Our state does contribute, but on a modest scale. In Panama City, Eastern Shipbuilding Group is building the Coast Guard’s new Heritage-class Offshore Patrol Cutters. These are significant ships for the Coast Guard, but they are not warships in the sense of carriers or destroyers. Eastern also fabricates big structural sections for destroyers, shipping them to Ingalls in Mississippi for final assembly. So Florida plays the role of a subcontractor, feeding the big yards. Over on the east coast of the state, St. Johns Ship Building has only just landed its first Navy contract, for a dive support vessel. That’s a small specialty ship, not a combatant.

The truth is, Florida’s role in naval construction is peripheral. We are helpers, not leaders, in the industrial chain. But it was not always that way. Tampa, for instance, once had real shipbuilding power. Tampa Shipyards was a substantial facility, capable of building large oceangoing ships. George Steinbrenner, before he became the famous owner of the New York Yankees, built his fortune in that business. The Tampa yard was known more for commercial ships than for naval ones, but the capability was there. It had the land, the docks, the workforce.

When Tampa Shipyards closed in 1984, the United States lost something more than just a business. It lost surge capacity. In a time of crisis, that yard could have been called upon to produce auxiliary ships, cargo hulls, or even adapted combatants. Instead, the gates shut, the workers moved on, and the land was repurposed for repair and maintenance work. Another link in the chain was broken.

Think about what that means strategically. China has multiple yards along its entire coast. South Korea has Ulsan and more. The United States has maybe four or five major facilities, and some of those are stretched to the limit. Losing Tampa did not wipe out America’s naval shipbuilding, but it did shrink the margin of safety. We went from a system with depth to a system skating on thin ice.

That is where we are today. The U.S. Navy depends on a few scattered yards — Maine, Mississippi, Virginia, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and a handful of smaller players in Florida, Wisconsin, and Louisiana. Each is critical, each is vulnerable, and none can replace the others overnight. When we talk about American manufacturing being “hollowed out,” this is what it looks like. Not completely gone, but dangerously thin. Not decimated, not annihilated, but caught somewhere in between.

5 - World War II — America’s Shipbuilding Arsenal

To really grasp how precarious today’s naval shipbuilding situation is, you have to rewind to the 1940s. During World War II, the United States didn’t just build ships — it built an entire floating armada at a pace the world had never seen before and has never seen since.

The scale is hard to put into modern terms. Between 1941 and 1945, American shipyards produced more than 6,000 naval vessels of all kinds: aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and thousands of support ships. On top of that, the country churned out more than 2,700 Liberty ships, the cargo vessels that carried troops, tanks, and supplies across the Atlantic and Pacific.

Where did this happen? Everywhere.

On the West Coast, Henry Kaiser’s yards in Richmond, California, became legendary. These were the “Liberty ship factories,” where whole ships rolled off assembly lines like cars in Detroit. One Liberty ship was famously built in under five days from keel laying to launch. Portland, Oregon, had its own booming yards, building escort carriers and troop transports. Seattle and Los Angeles also played major roles, feeding the Pacific theater.

On the East Coast, Bethlehem Steel operated yards in Baltimore and New York. Newport News, of course, was already turning out carriers and battleships. Smaller yards in New Jersey, Philadelphia, and Boston were launching destroyers and submarines. In the Gulf, places like Mobile, Alabama, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, roared with activity. Even inland rivers like the Ohio and Mississippi had smaller yards building landing craft and auxiliary vessels.

And yes, Florida had its role. Jacksonville and Tampa contributed with smaller yards, producing tankers, freighters, and auxiliary ships. Tampa Shipyards, in particular, was active, laying the foundation for the commercial business that Steinbrenner later grew. During the war, every available waterfront was pressed into service.

The key point is that America’s shipbuilding effort was not concentrated in one or two places. It was dispersed across the entire country. The industrial base was so deep that if one yard slowed down, another picked up the slack. If a new design was needed, dozens of yards could adapt. That flexibility gave the U.S. Navy not just numbers, but resilience.

The workforce was just as remarkable. Millions of Americans, including women entering heavy industry for the first time, learned how to weld, rivet, and fit ships together. Training was rapid, standards were high enough for war, and production never stopped. Yards operated twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. If a ship rolled down the ways at 2:00 a.m., there was a band playing and a crowd cheering.

By the end of the war, the United States had not only supplied itself but also built ships for its allies. Britain, the Soviet Union, and dozens of smaller nations received American-built hulls. It was the arsenal of democracy in the truest sense.

Compare that to today. Instead of dozens of major yards, we rely on five or six. Instead of Liberty ships launched in days, we build destroyers in years. Instead of surging thousands of vessels in four years, we struggle to maintain a fleet of 300. The contrast is so stark that it feels almost surreal.

This is why I say our shipbuilding base today is not decimated — which would mean a ten percent cut — and not annihilated, which would mean nothing left. It is something in between. We still have Newport News. We still have Bath and Ingalls. We still have Electric Boat. But the depth, the redundancy, the ability to surge? That is gone. And history proves that when conflict comes, surge capacity is what wins wars at sea.

6 - Closing Reflection — Where U.S. Manufacturing Stands Today

When you line it all up — South Korea’s massive yards, China’s industrial machine, Newport News’ bottleneck, America’s few scattered facilities, and the ghost of Tampa’s lost capacity — the picture is sobering.

The United States still has the crown jewels: nuclear-powered carriers and submarines that no other country can match. Those remain technological marvels and symbols of global reach. But outside of those highly specialized vessels, our shipbuilding base has grown dangerously thin. It has not been decimated — a loss of ten percent. It has not been annihilated — a loss of one hundred percent. Instead, it is caught somewhere in between, hollowed out to the point where the margin of safety is razor-thin. That is dangerous, because naval power is not just about today’s fleet. It is about the ability to replace losses, expand rapidly, and keep pressure on adversaries in a prolonged conflict.

China understands this. That is why they have covered their entire coastline with yards. South Korea understands this. That is why they treat Ulsan as a national treasure. During World War II, we understood it. We spread shipbuilding across both coasts, inland rivers, and every available port. We did not rely on one yard. We relied on many. And that depth won the war at sea.

Today, America is still strong, but the foundation is fragile. If one yard stumbles, the entire fleet feels it. If one dry dock falls behind, schedules ripple for years. That is the price of letting manufacturing capacity shrink to the edge of viability.

This is not a call for despair. It is a call for awareness — and for conversation. At Truesdell Wealth, we study these patterns not just because they are fascinating history or current events, but because they connect directly to how we invest. Military procurement is not just a defense policy issue; it is an investment reality. That is why we maintain a separately managed account we call the Military Procurement Portfolio. It is designed to track and engage with the very companies that build, supply, and sustain America’s fleet.

To continue this conversation, I would like to personally invite you to our next Casual Cocktail Conversation. The topic: the United States Navy, with a focus on aircraft carriers — the most powerful and complex ships in the world, built only at Newport News. This event will be held at the Stonewater Club. Reservations are required. Call 352-612-1000 for more information and to reserve your place.

This session is part of our ongoing discussion series, where we take complex issues like shipbuilding, defense procurement, and American manufacturing, and make them understandable, relatable, and relevant to your financial future. Because understanding the world’s industrial and military balance of power is not just about strategy at sea. It is about strategy in your portfolio.

At our upcoming Casual Cocktail Conversation at the Stonewater Club in Stone Creek, Ocala, Florida, I will be expanding on the themes we have just walked through together. We will go deeper into the industrial realities of America’s naval shipbuilding, but more importantly, we will open the floor for a wide-ranging discussion. This is not just about numbers, yards, and tonnage — it is about the history, philosophy, and strategy of sea power, and what it means for the United States today.

I will share additional details about the U.S. Navy’s unique position in the world, from its modern reliance on a handful of shipyards to the historic lessons of John Paul Jones, who gave us the Navy’s fighting spirit, and Teddy Roosevelt, who sent the Great White Fleet around the globe as a symbol of American strength. These stories are not just patriotic anecdotes; they are reminders of how sea power has always been tied to industrial power, leadership, and vision.

Most importantly, this will be a conversation, not a lecture. I want those in attendance to share their own perspectives, opinions, and ideas. The strength of these gatherings comes from the exchange of viewpoints, the connections we make, and the insights we draw together. I invite you to bring your voice to the table as we connect the past, present, and future of the United States Navy.